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Belcourt Public School District v. Davis, 786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015)
Hallie E. Bishop
Belcourt Public School District v. Davis affirms a narrower scope of the
first Montana exception, which provides one of two mechanisms to establish
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members. Belcourt Public School District
affirms that the first Montana exception does not apply to State officers or
entities acting within their governmental capacity, but only to those private
individuals who voluntarily enter into agreements with a tribe.
I. INTRODUCTION
Belcourt Public School District v. Davis follows the precedent of
Montana v. United States, where the Supreme Court of the United States set forth
the framework used to determine whether tribal subject matter jurisdiction exists
in civil litigation over non-members.1 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit determined that the Belcourt Public School District (“School
District”) was not subject to tribal jurisdiction despite its agreement with the
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians (“Tribe”), and its location within the
Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation (“Reservation”). 2 The court held that the
School District, acting as a governmental entity, was unable to enter to a private,
consensual, commercial dealings with the Tribe as required to fulfill the first
Montana v. United States exception. Because the Montana exceptions were not
fulfilled, the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
“The School District is a political subdivision of the State of North
Dakota.”3 The School District operates within the boundaries of the Reservation.4
The North Dakota Constitution requires that all children within the School
District must receive an education.5 For this reason, the Tribe and School District
entered into a series of agreements in 2006 and 2009, recognizing their mutual
responsibility to educate all children, Indian and non-Indian.6 These agreements
provided that the School District had the exclusive authority over the daily
operations of the Turtle Mountain Community High School.7
Several tribal members filed suit against the School District in Turtle
Mountain Tribal Court (“Tribal Court”) alleging excessive force, defamation, and
1

Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 662.
3
Id. at 656 (citing Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. #1 v. State By and Through N.D.
Legislative Assembly, 511 N.W.2d 247, 251 (N.D. 1994).
4
Id.
5
Id.; see N.D. Const. art. VIII, § 1.
6
Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist., 786 F.3d at 656.
7
Id.
2

2

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

multiple employment-related claims. 8 Relying on Nevada v. Hicks, 9 the Tribal
Court dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction.10 The Tribe appealed to the
Turtle Mountain Tribal Court of Appeals (“Tribal Court of Appeals”), which
reversed.11 Noting that the School District knowingly signed an agreement with
the Tribe subjecting itself to tribal jurisdiction, the Tribal Court of Appeals held
that Hicks was not dispositive.12 The School District then filed an action in the
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, seeking an
injunction and a declaratory judgement stating that the Tribal Court lacked
jurisdiction over the School District.13 Ultimately, the School District moved for
summary judgment, which the district court denied. 14 Distinguishing the case
from Montana v. United States,15 the district court held that jurisdiction properly
resided in the Tribal Court.16
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the School District argued that the Tribal
Court lacked jurisdiction over non-members because the Tribe had failed to
demonstrate the applicability of either exception recognized in Montana.17
III. ANALYSIS
A. Foundation of Tribal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Montana v. United States
The general rule expressed in Montana is that a sovereign tribe lacks
civil jurisdiction over the conduct of non-members on the reservation, unless
their activities fall within one of two narrow exceptions.18 The first exception
exists where the tribe and the non-members have entered into a consensual
relationship through commercial dealings, contracts, or other arrangements.19 The
second exception exists where the conduct of the non-members threatens or has
direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, or welfare of the tribe.20
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I. The First Montana Exception: Consensual Relationship with Tribe
The School District argued that the agreements did not establish tribal
jurisdiction under the first Montana exception because North Dakota law
specifies that a school district cannot “authorize an agreement that enlarges or
diminishes civil jurisdiction over matters that may be exercised by tribal
governments.”21 The court agreed, and determined that the School District did
not, through its contract with the Tribe, represent its intention to deviate from this
law.22
The Eighth Circuit further observed that even if the School District could
agree to the expansion of tribal jurisdiction, the first Montana exception still
would not apply. 23 The Tribe argued that a consensual relationship existed
because the School District knowingly entered into a series of arrangements with
the Tribe.24 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have held that contractual relationships between tribes and government entities
do not constitute consensual relationships as required by the exception.25
The Eighth Circuit found Red Mesa Unified School District v. Yellowtail
persuasive.26 In Red Mesa, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona concluded that the Navajo Nation lacked jurisdiction over employmentrelated claims against the Red Mesa School District, which operated within the
boundaries of the Navajo reservation. 27 The court held that the relationship
between the Navajo Nation and school district was not consensual because the
relationship stemmed from a state-mandated duty to educate children.28 The court
continued, stating that the first Montana exception fails because, despite the
status of the Red Mesa School District as tribal lessees, the employment
decisions at issue were made while the school district was operating within its
governmental capacities, as mandated by the state constitution.29
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the School District and Tribe did not
enter into a private consensual relationship.30 The court determined that the Tribe
and School District entered into an agreement because of a constitutionallyimposed mandate requiring all children within North Dakota to receive
education.31 The court, therefore, determined that the Tribe and School District
did not enter into a consensual relationship as required for the first Montana
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exception to apply. 32 The court did not rule out the possibility that such a
relationship could arise; only that it was not the case in the agreement between
the School District and the Tribe.33
II. The Second Montana Exception: Conduct Threatening Welfare of Tribe
The second Montana exception allows for tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers if their conduct threatens the welfare of the tribe.34 The Tribe argued
that the conduct of the School District injures the Tribe’s welfare.35 The court
noted that not every event that impacts the tribe’s welfare, economy, or political
integrity fulfills this exception.36 The court reviewed the narrow scope of this
exception, citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,
which held the conduct of non-Indians must do more than merely injure the
tribe.37 Indeed, the conduct must “‘imperil the subsistence’ of the Tribe.”38 In
addition, Plains Commerce Bank held that tribal jurisdiction should only be
allowed when “‘necessary to avert catastrophic consequences’” for the Tribe.39
The court found Plains Commerce Bank persuasive, and concluded that
employment and excessive force claims did not threaten the welfare of the tribe,
as required by the second Montana exception.40 The court determined that the
Tribe failed to prove that the conduct of the School District “imperil the
subsistence” of the Tribe, or that the exercise of tribal jurisdiction was “necessary
to avert catastrophic consequences.”41
IV. CONCLUSION
Belcourt Public School District v. Davis reaffirms the landmark cases
concerning tribal civil jurisdiction in Montana v. United States and Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co. The court echoed the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits, establishing that public school districts and tribes cannot
enter into a consensual relationship as required by the Montana exception to
establish tribal jurisdiction. This case shows that the first Montana exception is
determinative on the court’s interpretation of a private, consensual relationship
between the public entity and the tribe. The court then simply applied the
Supreme Court’s previous decisions to negate the application of the second
Montana exception. The court concluded that the Tribe failed to meet the burden
32
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of proof that either of the Montana exceptions applied to establish tribal
jurisdiction over the School District.42 Therefore, the district court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the claims was proper.43
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